Analysis – In late 1942, after a victory over German forces in North Africa, Winston Churchill told a Lord Mayor’s luncheon that: “This is not the end. It is not even the beginning of the end. But it is, perhaps, the end of the beginning”.
A destroyed Russian tank on the outskirts of Kharkiv in Ukraine. Photo: AFP
So might we think of the developments in Ukraine over the past several days.
There is a growing consensus from both official sources and other experts that Russian forces have, or are on the cusp of, culminating in Ukraine. What does this mean?
Military doctrine defines culmination as “the point at which continuing the attack is no longer possible and the force must consider reverting to a defensive posture or attempting an operational pause”.
This is what appears to have happened in Ukraine.
But as Churchill knew, reverses suffered by the enemy are rarely the end of a fight. The culmination of this disastrous Russian campaign is not the end of the war. It is, unfortunately, just a pause.
Therefore, it is worth examining what the proposition that the Russians have “culminated” means for Russia and for Ukraine.
What does it mean for Russia?
Most importantly, it might force Russian President Vladimir Putin to reset his objectives for Ukraine.
Given his recent speeches it is doubtful that Putin will be satisfied with the current gains made by his forces. There has been progress in creating a land bridge from Russia to Crimea, but the Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts are yet to be fully secured.
This was a central aim of Russia’s special military operation. Therefore, Putin is probably gathering his small circle of advisers to ascertain how long his country can fight on with international sanctions continuing to bite, what might be achieved militarily after a pause, and what resources would be required.
Because Putin has already committed more than half of Russia’s ground forces to the war, his new “theory of victory” might include some form of national mobilisation of personnel and industry.
Vladimir Putin acknowledges the crowd at a rally in Moscow at the weekend. Photo: AFP
There is already some evidence that factories producing precision weapons are now running 24 hours a day. Russia is already calling up military reserves. Despite the impact of the sanctions, Putin may decide to further mobilise his nation to achieve victory in Ukraine.
An operational pause by the Russians might see them shut down one of their fronts in the east or south to significantly reinforce the north. This would make sense if the capture of Kyiv is – as many analysts have described – the Russian main effort.
It would also allow the Russians to fix their collapsing tactical and operational logistics system, and to get their air force into the fight.
Any pause in the war might also give Putin time to build a domestic constituency for the war. He did not do so before the invasion. While this would now be a very big ask, it is not inconceivable that he could build support for the war among a larger proportion of Russia.
Preparing for the long haul?
There has been some speculation that Russia might revert to a longer-term war of exhaustion or attrition against Ukraine.
While a war of attrition broadly works in Russia’s favour – and Putin knows western publics grow tired of war quickly – it is also worth noting that it is fighting alone under ever-tightening sanctions.
The US and other nations are pouring weapons and resources into Ukraine and can do so for a long time to come.
However, many nations facing worse odds have continued fighting long after it made sense to do so. Just because we think that the resources of the West vastly outweigh those available to Russia, it doesn’t mean that this logic is compelling to Putin.
Russian forces might therefore settle in for long term sieges of Ukrainian cities (think the Siege of Sarajevo in the 1990s), without ground assaults to capture them. This would be “attrition from afar” for Russian forces.
Cities like Kharkiv and Mariupol have already endured weeks of shelling by Russian forces. Photo: AFP
A situation like this would probably force the Ukrainians onto the offensive against prepared Russian defences. It would be politically difficult for Ukrainian president Vlodomyr Zelensky to keep his military on the defensive while his people are dying and the Russians sit safely behind defensive works.
This would require a change of strategy and tactics from the Ukrainians. They have done very well on the defensive so far – how would they perform on the offensive?
Smoke rises from a Russian tank destroyed by Ukrainian forces in Lugansk region on February 26, 2022. Photo: AFP or licensorsRussia’s other options
What if Russia does not choose a long-term attrition approach? It does have other options.
With the exception of surrendering to Ukraine (impossible to imagine) or withdrawing (very unlikely), all of Russia’s options are grim.
Russia may decide to escalate the war. This might take the form of attacks on the supply bases and routes that are supplying Ukraine’s defenders. Or it might just target border crossing locations where weapons and supplies enter Ukraine.
Finally, Russia might seek a breakthrough with a weapon of mass destruction to destroy a portion of the Ukrainian government and military, or to shock it into submission.
Russia has a range of different weapons it could use in such a scenario. It could include a tactical nuclear weapon, a radiological weapon, massive drone swarms, destructive cyber-attacks, chemical or biological weapons or EMP (electromagnetic pulse) weapons. Or a combination of the above.
A Russia that has been out-fought and out-thought by the Ukrainians is only more dangerous.
As American scholar Kori Schake wrote over the weekend: “Russia’s military failures are likely to prevent the conquest and long-term occupation of Ukraine … The weaknesses of Russia’s military could drive the cost much higher. Failing militaries can be even more dangerous than successful ones.”
What might a Russian pause mean for Ukraine?
First, it provides the courageous Ukrainian military with some breathing space to reorganise its defences, re-equip with additional Western weapons and train new recruits.
It should also permit Ukraine – Russian forces willing – to extract its civilians from ruined or threatened cities. The evacuation of Ukrainian citizens from cities terrorised by Russian artillery, missiles, hostage-taking, and other unethical behaviours would be a priority.
A pause also allows the Ukrainian government time to stockpile food, fuel and other necessities to keep their society functioning.
Any Russian halt in operations, albeit temporary, would also allow the Ukrainian government and military to reconsider their strategy.
They have done a magnificent job so far in defending their nation, while also executing a breathtaking influence campaign that has mobilised global opinion in their support. But if the Russians change their approach, the Ukrainians will have to as well. They will need a revised strategy for any evolved or escalated Russian operations.
Ukrainian soldiers on the streets of Kyiv. Ukraine will need a revised strategy for any evolved or escalated Russian operations, Mick Ryan writes. Photo: 2022 Getty ImagesNo cause for celebration yet
Finally, any Russian operational pause provides space for President Zelensky to rest, think and consult more widely about war termination, and what kinds of agreements would be acceptable with Russia. Wars only end through political agreements.
And any political agreement, when it comes, will need to address the destruction and death wrought by the Russians. While the Russians may have been fought to a near standstill, it has come at great cost to Ukrainians.
